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Gábor Kertesi - Gábor Kézdi 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the kindergarten attendance allowance program in Hungary, a conditional 
cash transfer (CTT) program introduced in 2009 that aimed to increase kindergarten enrollment 
of disadvantaged children aged 3 and 4. Administration of the program was decentralized, and 
we make use of the substantial regional variation in program take-up across municipalities to 
estimate the program’s effect on enrollment rates. We show modest but non-negligible effects, 
despite problems related to the manner of the program’s implementation. We also show that the 
effects were significantly stronger in areas characterized by an excess supply of kindergarten 
slots. The results testify to the potential of CCT programs to create demand for child-care 
services among disadvantaged families; however, the results also highlight the importance of 
creating an adequate supply of kindergarten facilities where needed. 
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Az óvodáztatási támogatásról  
Egy feltételekhez kötött készpénz-támogatási program értékelése 
 
Kertesi Gábor - Kézdi Gábor 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Tanulmányunk a 2009. januárjában bevezetett óvodáztatási támogatás hatását próbálja a 
bevezetést követő két év tényadatai alapján felmérni. Intézményszintű óvodai és településszintű 
demográfiai adatok tízéves (2001-2010) idősorára, valamint az Államkincstár 2009-2010. évi 
óvodáztatási támogatásra vonatkozó településsoros adataira támaszkodva, megvizsgáljuk, hogy 
az óvodáztatási támogatás mint feltételekhez kötött készpénz-támogatási program hatására 
igazolhatóan megnőtt-e 2009-2010-ben (és ha igen, milyen mértékben) a halmozottan hátrányos 
helyzetű családokban nevelt, 3-4 éves korú gyermekek célcsoportjában az óvodai részvétel. 
Becslési eredményeink pozitív hatást mutatnak ki, a hatás mértéke azonban mérsékelt. A 
program elemeit elemezve rámutatunk több olyan problémára és hiányosságra, amely felelős 
lehet a gyenge hatásokért. A becsült hatások ott a legmagasabbak, ahol az óvodai férőhelyek 
száma meghaladja a potenciális igényeket és jóval alacsonyabbak a férőhelyhiányos területeken. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: óvoda, feltételes készpénz-támogatás, programértékelés, Magyarország 
 
JEL kódok: I20, I38 
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This paper evaluates the kindergarten attendance allowance program, introduced in Hungary in 
2009. This program was a conditional cash transfer (CTT) program aimed at increasing 
kindergarten enrollment of children aged 3 and 4 from disadvantaged families. Eligible families 
received the allowance if they enrolled their children and their attendance was regular. 
Participation in the program was voluntary; however, the program was administered in a 
decentralized fashion, introducing substantial regional variation in program take-up rates. We 
make use of that variation in a difference-in-differences setup to estimate the effects of the 
program on enrollment. We estimate the effect of the program on enrollment rates of children of 
ages 3 and 4. 
International data demonstrate that children from poor and uneducated families begin 
formal schooling with major deficits (Hart – Risley [1995], Lee – Burkam [2002]). We present 
evidence that Hungary is no exception. Kindergarten programs can play an important role in 
mitigating the disadvantages of young children raised in low-education, low-income families. 
Hungary has a universal kindergarten system that is open to all children of age 3 and above. For 
the time period of our investigation, attending kindergarten was compulsory beginning at age 5, 
and compliance was almost perfect. At the same time, only half of the children of the least 
educated fifth of mothers were enrolled at age 3. Compelling these children to attend 
kindergarten was the aim of the kindergarten attendance allowance program. 
Using administrative data on kindergarten enrollment and population as well as on program 
take-up, we estimate difference-in-differences models of the effect of the kindergarten 
attendance allowance program on enrollment rates. The unit of observation for enrollment is the 
kindergarten; the unit of observation for population and program take-up is the town or village. 
The two levels do not match perfectly, as there are many villages without kindergartens, and 
many children attend kindergarten in villages or towns that differ from the villages or town in 
which they reside. For our analysis, we define kindergarten catchment areas, using data from a 
survey on commuting to kindergartens between towns and villages.  
Our results show that kindergarten enrollment increased to a significantly greater extent in 
areas with high program take-up than in areas with low or zero take-up. This result shows a 
substantial increase relative to pre-existing trends. In addition, the increase is observable in the 
high take-up areas only, supporting the interpretation of a causal effect of the program. A simple 
calculation suggests that approximately one sixth of the 3 to 4-year-old children supported by 
the program enrolled in kindergarten as a consequence of the program. We also show that the 
effect of the program was largest in areas with an excess supply of kindergarten slots. This result 
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highlights the importance of creating adequate supply to meet the increased demand that arises 
from a conditional cash transfer program. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents evidence of a 
deficit among disadvantaged children in terms of kindergarten attendance in Hungary before the 
program and suggests that both supply and demand factors were responsible for this deficit. We 
then provide a brief overview of the administrative rules regarding the kindergarten attendance 
allowance program. The next section describes the data and the measurement strategy used. We 
then show the results of the program evaluation analysis. A final section concludes. 
EARLY CHILDHOOD DEFICITS AND KINDERGARTEN ATTENDANCE IN 
HUNGARY 
The Hungarian data are in line with international surveys (Lee–Burkam [2002], Neuman  
[2006]): children from poor families amass significant cognitive deficits before reaching school 
age. Convincing evidence is provided by a nationally representative, longitudinal survey of 
approximately 5,000 first-grade students, launched in the fall of 2003 by the Szeged University 
Research Group on the Development of Competencies1 (Table 1). In the group most likely to 
include children from poor and uneducated families – where mothers have not completed more 
than 8 years of schooling – we find that measured skills lag behind those of the overall 
population by an average of 0.5-1.5 standard deviation units. 
There are various reasons why young children amass such significant skill deficits. Brooks-
Gunn and Markman [2005] review the international literature, and Zita Réger [1995] describes 
the problem in the context of Roma children's difficulties in school. Kindergartens with strong 
educational programs can play an important role in reducing such differences in school 
readiness. 
                                                 
1 Led by Benő Csapó. 
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Table 1 
Basic competencies measured in the first grade (November) of elementary school: 
deviations from the main average, measured in standard deviation units, 
computed for the sample of the given test 
(Szeged University Research Group on the Development of Competencies, 
longitudinal study, 2003, N = 5138) 
 
Skills 
Mother’s education 
Grades 
0-7  
8th 
grade 
Vocational 
training 
High 
school 
diploma 
College 
(BA) 
University 
diploma 
(MA) 
Social skills –1.21 –0.45 –0.07 0.11 0.43 0.55 
Basic arithmetic –1.39 –0.49 –0.12 0.25 0.40 0.63 
Empirical reasoning –0.97 –0.43 –0.09 0.21 0.45 0.55 
Relational vocabulary –1.04 –0.48 –0.09 0.15 0.39 0.47 
Fine motor skills –0.85 –0.33 –0.10 0.13 0.30 0.42 
Average of basic skills –1.51 –0.55 –0.12 0.23 0.49 0.75 
Distribution of 
students 
3% 17% 28% 33% 13% 6% 
Source: Józsa [2004], calculated on the basis of tables 2 and 4. 
 
Based on data from the 2006 Hungarian Assessment of Basic Competencies, administered to 
a full cohort of 4th graders, Table 2 shows that students from poor and uneducated families who 
attended kindergarten for longer periods of time achieved significantly better results. Among 
poor children with mothers with 0 to 7 years of education, the difference between children who 
spend 3 to 4 years in kindergarten and children who spend 2 or fewer years in kindergarten is 30 
percent of a standard deviation. The difference becomes smaller as we compare children with 
more educated mothers. Although a lack of exogenous variability prevents us from establishing 
causal relationships, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that longer kindergarten 
attendance could mitigate the consequences of initial deficits. The results also suggest that the 
more disadvantaged are children, the greater the potential benefits of kindergarten education. 
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Table 2 
Standardized test scores* of 4th grade children from poor and low-education 
families**, according to the mother’s education and length of kindergarten 
attendance (2006 National Assessment of Basic Competencies) 
Mother’s 
education 
Years of kindergarten attendance 
Total 
Difference of 
columns 1 and 3 
[in st. dev. units, 
%] 
Under 2 
years 
2 years 3 or 4 years 
Grades 0-7 –1.22 –1.03 –0.92 –1.02 30% 
8thgrade –0.89 –0.75 –0.61 –0.67 28% 
Vocational 
training 
–0.49 –0.35 –0.27 –0.29 22% 
High school 
diploma 
–0.10 –0.15 –0.04 –0.05 6% 
* The average values of 5 competency tests standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
Competencies tested: (i) reading, (ii) writing, (iii) arithmetic, (iv) systematic reasoning, and (v) 
combinatorial reasoning. The group of József Nagy and Tibor Vidákovich developed the tests.  
**All families included here receive regular child protection benefits, and the fathers’ maximum 
educational attainment is a high school diploma (if there is a father in the household). 
 
Although more disadvantaged children appear to benefit disproportionately from attending 
kindergarten, they attend for fewer years. We summarize the most current data on kindergarten 
attendance in Table 3. The source of our data is the 2005 Hungarian micro-census.2 According 
to these data, two-thirds of 3-year-olds and almost half of 4-year-olds whose mothers have not 
completed 8 years of school do not attend kindergarten. This ratio is somewhat better, but still 
quite high, for children of mothers who have completed 8 years of schooling: more than one-
third of 3-year-olds and 15% of 4-year-olds do not attend kindergarten. 
We face an unusually clear public policy task. Increasing kindergarten attendance of children 
from the most disadvantaged families is likely to benefit the development of such children. To 
appreciate the magnitude of the task, let us make a simple estimate. If the public policy goal is 
for 3- to 4-year-olds from uneducated families to attend kindergarten at the same rate as 3- to 4-
year-olds whose mothers have finished vocational training (i.e., 78% of 3-year-olds and 93% of 
4-year-olds), then – considering that the cohort of children born per year is approximately 
100,000 – approximately 10,000 additional 3- to 4-year-olds would attend kindergarten. 
 
                                                 
2  The data of the 2011 Census are not available at present (Summer 2013). 
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Table 3 
Percentage of children not attending kindergarten, according to children’s age and 
the mother’s education 
Children’s age 
(years) 
Mother’s education 
Total Grades 
0-7  
8thgrade 
Vocational 
training 
High school 
diploma 
University 
diploma 
3* 71 38 22 19 20 27 
4 45 15 7 7 5 10 
5 11 6 3 4 2 4 
6** 5 3 1 3 3 2 
Distribution of 3- to 
6-year-olds 
4% 26% 24% 31% 15% 100% 
Source:  2005 micro-census. 
*   According to our own calculations from the 2008 wave of the Hungarian Household Budget survey, 
6.3% of 3-year-olds attend nursery school instead. 
** This row shows the percentage of 6-year-olds who attend neither kindergarten nor school. 
 
Both supply and demand factors may prevent these 10,000 3- to 4-year-olds from attending 
kindergarten. On the supply side, availability or capacity of kindergartens may be inadequate. On 
the demand side, even if kindergartens were available in adequate capacity, the most 
disadvantaged families may be less likely to enroll their children. Supply can be measured by the 
availability of kindergarten slots reported by kindergartens for each year covered by the 
institutional data (for more details, see the Data section) divided by the population of the 
relevant age group. Because the geographic definitions of the two data sources do not match 
(many children commute to kindergartens located outside their villages or towns of residence), 
we created catchment areas that are closed to commuting. For more details, see the Data section.  
Table 4 shows the percentage of children who attended kindergarten for 2 years or less, 
broken down by the relative kindergarten supply indicator of the area where they reside (in five 
equal-sized categories) and the level of education of their parents. These estimates are calculated 
for 1998 to 2000 to match the data on parental education and the length of kindergarten 
enrollment that we calculate from the 2006 sample of 4th graders provided by the Hungarian 
Assessment of Basic Competences (the 4th graders in 2006 were 4 years old in 1998 to 2000). 
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Table 4 
Percentage of students who attended kindergarten for 2 years or less, broken down 
by the relative kindergarten supply indicator in the area of residence at age 4 and 
parents’ education 
(2006 National Assessment of Basic Competencies, 4th grade students; estimates 
for 1998 to 2000) 
Five equal-sized groups of students, 
based on the value of the relative 
kindergarten supply indicator* in the 
area of residence at age 4  
Parents’ education**  
 
Total 
 
 
 
Difference 
of columns 
(1) and (3) 
 
Grades 
0-8 
 
Vocational 
training 
 
High 
school 
diploma 
 
University 
diploma 
 
Shortage of 
kindergarten 
slots 
Bottom fifth 39 19 11 10 20 28 
 2nd fifth 30 13 9 8 15 21 
 3rd fifth 21 10 7 6 11 14 
 4th fifth 18 8 7 5 10 11 
Excess supply of 
kindergarten 
slots 
Top fifth 19 9 7 7 11 12 
Total 25 12 8 7 13 17 
*   Relative kindergarten supply indicator = number of kindergarten slots / number of children aged 3-6 in 
the municipalities of a given kindergarten catchment area. 
** Neither parent has completed more schooling than the values given.  
 
The total column in the table indicates that the shortage of kindergartens limits attendance 
in all social groups. The last column of the table shows that the children of uneducated parents 
have lower kindergarten attendance rates in every category of kindergarten supply, including in 
areas with excess supply. However, the more severe is the shortage of kindergarten slots, the 
larger is the kindergarten attendance deficit of children of uneducated parents. This fact may 
indicate that, where supply is inadequate, the children of higher-status families drive out the 
children of lower-status families. Taken together, the figures indicate that both supply and 
demand factors are at work in the low attendance rate of low-status children. 
The evidence presented above indicates the need for a complex intervention policy. Such 
intervention must address both supply- and demand-side problems. On the supply side, 
additional kindergarten capacity must be established in underserved areas. Perhaps less obvious, 
kindergartens may encourage enrollment by decreasing the social and cultural distance between 
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kindergartens and poor and uneducated families.3 Other actors, such as visiting nurses and 
representatives of the child protection agency, may also play a role in improving relationships 
between kindergartens and families. Transition programs for the children should be established 
with the involvement of the affected parents. All these recommendations are included among the 
policy recommendations of the Education and Children's Opportunity Round Table, prepared for 
the government in 2008 (see Havas [2008], 135). Although the necessity of these measures has 
been broadly acknowledged since 2004 (see Havas [2004]), there has been almost no progress 
on these issues over the past decade. This lack of progress is particularly problematic in light of 
the fact that the education authorities had many billions of euros from EU sources at their 
disposal, money that could have been used to fully implement the necessary kindergarten 
construction and expansion program within a few years.4  
On the demand side, strong monetary incentives may induce poor and uneducated families 
to enroll their children in kindergarten as early as possible (ideally at age 3). While free of charge 
in principle, kindergarten imposes costs that may be large for the most disadvantaged families. 
These expenses can act as an obstacle to kindergarten attendance for those who most need it.5 
The kindergarten attendance allowance program was created in 2009 to provide monetary 
incentives for, and compensate for some of the extra costs of, kindergarten attendance of the 
poorest Hungarian children.  
THE KINDERGARTEN ATTENDANCE ALLOWANCE PROGRAM 
The Education and Children's Opportunity Round Table recommended the introduction of a 
kindergarten attendance allowance in 2008. The government accepted this recommendation and 
introduced the program in January 2009. However, the implementation of the program was far 
from ideal, and government action did not mitigate the constraints on supply in underserved 
areas. The program was ended in 2013, with new legislation introduced that makes kindergarten 
attendance compulsory for every child starting at age 3. 
                                                 
3 "Another reason why the children of poor and uneducated families are not enrolled in kindergarten at 
age 3, and why their attendance is irregular, is that there is a mutual lack of trust between the 
kindergartens and the parents. Parents are afraid that their children will find themselves in a foreign and 
hostile world where they will be looked down upon and discriminated against. The kindergartens worry 
that these children will cause insurmountable problems. This is why parents do not insist on enrollment or 
regular attendance and why the kindergarten makes no effort to change the status quo." (Havas [2004], 
13) 
4 These projects would also have had a budgetary impact due to increased maintenance costs. 
5 "The prices charged by kindergartens for meals, other contributions (for instance, for field trips), the 
provision of appropriate clothing for different seasons, the acquisition of bedsheets for the afternoon nap, 
etc., represent big financial burden to poor families that they are often reluctant to hasten their children's 
enrollment for that reason." (Havas [2004], 11-12) 
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The 1997/XXXI law on child protection (Gyvt.) was modified to introduce a kindergarten 
attendance allowance for eligible families that met specific conditions beginning January 1, 
2009. The details of the new legislation were established in Gyvt. 20/C and in government 
directive 149/1997 (IX. 10.) 68/F–L. The legislation establishes the following aspects of the 
program: eligibility, terms and conditions, amount of the allowance, and form and distribution 
of payments. 
Poor and uneducated families were eligible for the benefit if parents enrolled their child in 
kindergarten at ages 3 or 4. Poverty was defined as eligibility for a child protection subsidy, 
which was determined by means testing at the level of local municipalities. Only families in 
which neither parent had more than 8 years of education were eligible. The child was required to 
attend kindergarten regularly for at least two months after enrollment before receiving the 
subsidy.  
The first payment following the child's enrollment in kindergarten was 20,000 HUF (EUR 
70) (subsidy type “1a,” as defined by the law). The second and all subsequent payments following 
enrollment were 10,000 HUF (EUR 35) every six months (subsidy type “1b”), in June and 
December. The default option was a cash payment; however, local authorities could stipulate 
that the first payment be dispensed in kind rather than in cash. The distribution of cash 
payments was required to follow enrollment by at least two months. 
The program had two immediate goals. First, it aimed to increase kindergarten enrollment of 
3- and 4-year-olds in the target group who would not necessarily be enrolled in kindergarten at 
such an early age without an incentive. Second, it aimed to induce regular attendance of children 
from eligible families. The program also had indirect, longer-term goals related to children’s 
health and skills, as all CCT programs do. In addition to compelling parents to enroll their 
children in kindergarten at an early age, the kindergarten allowance was also intended to help 
parents recognize the importance of early enrollment and regular attendance to their children's 
development and enable them to shape parental practices accordingly. We believe that the 
program would have been more likely to achieve such significant changes if it included 
complementary elements such as activities that bring families and kindergartens closer together 
and the provision of various additional parenting tools (parental support groups, parent-child 
group activities, regular home visits to provide coaching in parenting skills, etc.).6  
                                                 
6 For instance, the Mexican Oportunidades (previously called Progresa), which is one of the largest CCT 
programs in the world, with many millions of eligible individuals, contains a number of such 
complementary parenting components: "Under these circumstances, interventions that seek to improve 
parenting practices and the quality of the home environment are likely to be particularly important. 
Oportunidades and some other CCTs attempt to expose parents to new information and practices by 
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The importance of a demand-side intervention is justified by the data. International 
experience (Fiszbein and Schady [2009]) shows that conditional cash transfers can create 
effective incentives. Thus, we can expect positive effects, particularly in terms of the immediate 
goals of the program. 
However, as implemented, the program suffered from several problems that were likely to 
weaken its effects. First, the delayed disbursement of the transfer (two months following 
enrollment) may have weakened the incentives designed to achieve the first immediate goal of 
the program: enrollment of children, especially of the poorest families, in kindergarten. Second, 
the transfer amount was relatively small: for comparison, the monthly allowance for families 
with children was HUF 13,300 (approximately EUR 45) per child (for two-child families). 
Calculated on a monthly basis, the kindergarten attendance allowance provided an additional 
HUF 2,500 (approximately EUR 9) in the first year and HUF 1,700 (approximately EUR 6) in 
the second year. Third, the option of providing in-kind benefits as opposed to cash transfers may 
have weakened enrollment incentives. Fourth, supply constraints were not considered in the 
design. The first three problems likely weakened the effect of the program everywhere. The 
fourth problem further weakened the effect of the program in areas with supply constraints. 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT STRATEGY 
The evaluation question of this paper is the impact of the kindergarten allowance program on 
enrollment in kindergarten. To answer this question, we must compare enrollment in 
kindergarten after implementation with enrollment that would have occurred had the program 
not been implemented (the counter-factual outcome). Participation in the kindergarten 
attendance allowance program was not randomized, which means that we must conduct a non-
experimental program evaluation to assess the effect of the program.  
In particular, we use a difference-in-differences strategy. We compare changes in the overall 
enrollment rate in areas with high take-up of the program (the treatment group) with changes in 
the enrollment rate in areas with zero take-up of the program (the control group). We further 
subdivide treated areas into low-, medium- and high-participation groups by program 
participation rate. These groups are characterized by different levels of "treatment intensity". In 
addition to comparing enrollment rates by treatment intensity, we also consider differences by 
                                                                                                                                                              
conditioning transfers on participation in talks (known as pláticas). The conditioned cash helps ensure 
that parents attend and participate in the pláticas. However, the cash-condition package offered by CCT 
programs may not be enough, and a comprehensive program that relies on more active participation by 
social workers and others may be needed." (Fiszbein-Schady [2009], 26. See also: Ibid, 55-56) 
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the interaction of treatment intensity and the supply of kindergarten slots. We expect the 
program to have significant effects in areas where there is a sufficient supply of kindergarten 
slots.  
We use data on program take-up at the level of municipalities (towns and villages)7, 
administrative data on age-specific enrollment in kindergarten at the level of kindergartens and 
age-specific data on residence at the level of municipalities. Ideally, we would have worked with 
enrollment rates by program eligibility age at the level of municipalities.  
The data on population by residence and age are collected by the Central Office for 
Administrative and Electronic Public Services. This data set breaks down the permanent 
population of the municipalities by age on January 1 of a given year.8 The source of our data on 
the number of kindergarteners is the Public Education Agency's school- and kindergarten-level 
database.9 The unit of observation is the kindergarten, and several variables are defined at this 
level, including the number of children enrolled by age. The Public Education Agency's definition 
of age groups differs from that of the population data (namely, children reaching a certain age in 
a given year), a discrepancy that we corrected for in matching the data (adjusting the population 
data by one year). From the number of children attending kindergarten in a given municipality, 
we cannot infer the number of kindergarteners living in that municipality. On the one hand, not 
all municipalities have a kindergarten; on the other hand, children may attend kindergarten in a 
municipality that differs from their place of residence. Unfortunately, the administrative 
database that collects data at the kindergarten level does not break down numbers of 
kindergarteners by place of residence. 
In the absence of comprehensive data on program eligibility and enrollment by place of 
residence, we worked with data aggregated for kindergarten catchment areas that are more-or-
less closed to commuting. Ideally, all children living in a catchment area would attend 
kindergarten in the same area, and vice versa. For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to 
have a sufficient number of catchment areas and sufficient heterogeneity in program 
                                                 
7 Every village and town in Hungary is a municipality; there are over 3,000 municipalities, with 
populations of at least 100, in Hungary. 
8 We particularly thank our colleagues at the Demographic Research Institute of the Central Statistical 
Office and Zsolt Spéder, who gave us access to the municipality-level database. The population data 
provide us with the denominator for the age-based kindergarten attendance rate. The numerator would be 
the number of children among them actually attending kindergarten; however, that information is not 
broken down by municipality. The data on the number of children enrolled in each Hungarian 
kindergarten are broken down by age. 
9 We were given access to the institution-level data (KIRSTAT) by the statistics office of the Department of 
Education (thanks to Tibor Könyvesi). 
15 
 
participation rates across different catchment areas. We accordingly attempted to define the 
smallest possible catchment areas that form closed commuting systems.10  
We defined the areas based on the kindergarteners' commuting data, using a graph-theory 
algorithm called Breadth-first search of connected components.11 The data on kindergarteners' 
commuting were drawn from our own survey. We asked the notary of each municipality to 
identify the number of kindergarten-age children living in the municipality, the number of these 
children attending kindergarten, and (if there is a kindergarten in the municipality) the number 
of children attending kindergarten in the municipality. If some of the children attended 
kindergarten in different municipalities, we asked the notaries to list the three most important 
municipalities to which the children commute.12 The algorithm that we used to define the 
catchment areas combined all of the municipalities that were connected by at least one 
commuter. 
Defined this way, catchment areas are imperfect in two respects. First, some catchment areas 
may be "too large". The municipalities can be connected by chains of commuting: a catchment 
area can contain places that are far from one another and clearly not directly connected by 
commuting. For example, if the inhabitants of A commute to B, the inhabitants of B to C, and the 
inhabitants of C to D, then all four municipalities will belong to the same catchment area, even if 
A and D are far from each other. Second, data recording problems may cause some catchment 
areas to become "too small". For instance, a catchment area that only contains one municipality 
may in fact include commuters who are not represented in our database because of a lack of data 
or because there happened to be no commuters during the year of the survey. The latter problem 
is more likely with small municipalities. 
We combined the 3,164 municipalities in Hungary into 1,420 kindergarten catchment areas. 
A significant number of catchment areas (one thousand) are composed of single municipalities, 
and there is one very large catchment area comprising a chain of over 100 municipalities (it 
includes Budapest and two other cities). We treated this large catchment area – and the few 
other relatively large catchment areas – no differently from all other catchment areas in our 
                                                 
10 For example, the existing Hungarian "micro-regions" were not suitable units for our analysis because, 
although they do form closed systems in terms of kindergarten commuting, few of them had no allowance 
recipients. 
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breadth-first_search. Many thanks to Péter Dívós and Tímea Molnár for 
their help with the programming. 
12 We thank Klára Csányi for help from the Civil Society Relations Department of the Ministry of Interior. 
Approximately 200 of the 3,000 municipalities did not respond to our survey, and in a further 70 cases, no 
kindergarten-age child lived in the municipality. We integrated these municipalities, if they had no 
kindergarten, into the catchment area of the nearest municipality with a kindergarten. For lack of 
information to the contrary, we assumed that in the municipalities that did not respond to our survey but 
did have a kindergarten, all children attend kindergarten locally. 
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analysis; however, we also estimated the impact of the program with these cases excluded. The 
results were similar, regardless of whether such cases were included or excluded from the 
analysis. 
We obtained municipality-level data on program participation from the Hungarian State 
Treasury.13 The data on the biannual money transfers include the sum transferred to each 
municipality as well as the number of payments made to newly enrolled children (as defined in 
Gyvt. 20/C § 1.a) and to already enrolled children (as defined in Gyvt.20/C §1.b). The child 
protection law sets the amount for newly enrolled children at 20,000 HUF and at 10,000 HUF 
for the other children. However, in practice, some of the children registered in category "1a" 
received only 10,000 HUF. This fact was likely due to the difficulty of determining which 
category they belonged to. For example, eligible children already attending kindergarten when 
the program was introduced received 10,000 HUF but were placed by the notaries in category 
"1a" because they were receiving the allowance for the first time. However, based on the data, we 
were able to calculate the number of allowance recipients in category "1a" who received 20,000 
HUF and who thus undoubtedly represent newly enrolled kindergarteners. Table 5 shows the 
national biannual monetary transfer data. 
We aggregated the municipality-level program participation data to the level of our 
kindergarten catchment areas. We divided the catchment areas into four groups based on the 
2010 participation data. The "0 participation rate" category comprised catchment areas in which 
no one applied for the kindergarten attendance allowance for newly enrolled children in 2010. 
The "low participation rate" category contained catchment areas in which 0.1-5% of newly 
enrolled 3- to 4-year-olds received the allowance in 2010. The "medium participation rate" 
category comprised catchment areas with 5.1-20% participation rates, and the "high 
participation rate" catchment areas had participation rates of over 20%. The 0 category is the 
control group, and the low, medium and high categories are the treatment groups, with 
increasing intensity of treatment. Table 6 shows the distribution of the catchment areas across 
the four categories. The table also shows the number of 3- to 4-year olds in a given category in 
2008 (the baseline year immediately preceding the introduction of the program). 
 
                                                 
13 We thank the Hungarian State Treasury, particularly Ildikó Kovátsné Puskás and Judit Várhidiné 
Kelemen. 
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Table 5 
Kindergarten attendance allowance payments broken down by the number of 
payments, type of payment, and actual sums transferred, 2009-2010 
 
Term 
Number of payments according to payment type 
and actual sum transferred 
Total number 
of type “1a” 
and“1b” 
payments 
Payment 
totals, 
[in 
million 
HUF] 
Gyvt. 20C §(1a)*  Gyvt. 20C 
§(1b) 
20,000 
HUF/person 
10,000 
HUF/person 
 10,000 
HUF/person 
2009/1 1 389 8 545  544 10 478 119 
2009/2 3 305 4 210  7 814 15 329 186 
2010/1 4 095 2 196  13 786 20 077 241 
2010/2 4 276 1 511  15 197 20 984 253 
* The law specifies that the families of newly enrolled children are to receive an initial payment of 
20,000 HUF (Gyvt. 20C § 1a). However, payments of both 10,000 and 20,000 HUF were made with 
reference to § 1a. We only accepted the latter numbers to represent newly enrolled children. Source: 
biannual, municipality-level Hungarian State Treasury data. 
 
 
As Table 6 shows, in nearly half of the catchment areas (47 %), no one applied for the 
kindergarten attendance allowance as a new applicant. However, these catchment areas are 
relatively small, containing only 12% of the 3 to 4-year-old population. There are fewer 
catchment areas in the low participation rate category; however, these areas represent two-thirds 
of the 3- to 4-year-old population (Budapest also belongs to this group). Of 3- to 4-year-olds, 
18% live in medium participation rate catchment areas and only 5% live in catchment areas with 
high participation rates. 
Table 6 
Distribution of kindergarten catchment areas and 3- to 4-year-olds living in 
catchment areas by catchment area-level program participation rates 
 
Program 
participation 
rates* 
Number of 
kindergarten 
catchment areas 
Number of 3- 
to 4-year-olds 
in 2008 
0 % 667 22890 
0.1 – 5 % 201 125756 
5.1 – 20 % 331 34767 
Over 20 %  221 9257 
Total 1420 192670 
* The number of children newly enrolled in kindergarten in 2010 
whose families received the 20,000 HUF payment / number of 3- 
to 4-year-olds living in the catchment area 
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In addition, we used another variable in our analyses to measure supply constraints of 
kindergartens. We calculated this variable as the "number of kindergarten slots" (the maximum 
capacity of a catchment area's kindergarten facilities), drawn from the kindergarten data in the 
school-level administrative database, divided by the number of 3- to 6-year-olds living in the 
catchment area. As with the kindergarten attendance rates, the imperfectly defined catchment 
areas lead to some measurement error. This error is exacerbated because 6-year-olds attend 
elementary school at different rates in different catchment areas, which means that the 
denominator cannot precisely match the number of potential kindergarteners, even in theory. 
For this reason, we have replaced the actual catchment area-level kindergarten capacity 
indicators with categories based on these indicators. 
ESTIMATES OF THE PROGRAM’S IMPACT BASED ON NATIONAL AGGREGATES 
First, we provide an estimate of the aggregate impact of the program. We analyze 3-year-olds 
and 4-year-olds' national kindergarten attendance rates in the baseline year preceding the 
introduction of the program (2008) and in the second year of the program (2010) when initial 
difficulties of the program have presumably been overcome. We then compare differences in 
kindergarten attendance rates between the two years with comparable differences over the 
period between 2006 and 2008. If we assume that trends between 2006 and 2008 would have 
continued absent the kindergarten attendance allowance program, the difference in differences 
will reveal additional growth due to the program. This assumption is strong, and the results 
should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, we present additional results that support the 
interpretation of the additional change as an effect of the program.  
Table 7 shows the aggregate results. According to the estimate, the program was responsible 
for the enrollment of approximately 900 3-year-olds and 550 4-year-olds, which sums to a total 
of 1,450 children. This number represents our estimate of the number of children who would not 
have enrolled in kindergarten if the kindergarten attendance allowance had not been 
implemented. 
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Table 7 
The number of children enrolled in kindergarten as a result of the kindergarten 
attendance allowance program on a national level 
Age Period 
Kindergarten attendance rate, 
% Δ % 
Δ number of 
kindergarten
ers Base year Reference year 
3-year-olds 
2006-2008 72.9 73.1 0.2 160 
2008-2010 73.1 74.2 1.1 1,066 
diff-in-
diffs 
– – – 906 
4-year-olds 
2006-2008 92.6 92.5 
–
0.1 
–87 
2008-2010 92.5 93.0 0.5 460 
diff-in-
diffs 
– – – 547 
3 and 4-
year-olds 
together 
2006-2008 – – – 73 
2008-2010 – – – 1,526 
diff-in-
diffs 
– – – 1,453 
 
The estimated increase in enrollment of 1,453 children can be compared to the number of 
kindergarten allowance recipients. According to the figures in Table 5 above, the total number of 
newly enrolled kindergarteners, whose families received the 20,000 HUF first payment in 2010, 
is 8,371. Together, these figures suggest that five-sixths of the newly enrolled 3- to 4-year-olds in 
the program would have been enrolled in kindergarten at this age, regardless of the allowance. 
However, one-sixth (1,453/8,371) of these children likely began attending kindergarten at such 
an early age as a result of the kindergarten attendance allowance program. 
Table 8 shows the changes between 2008 and 2010 broken down by treatment intensity. 
These figures are national aggregates of participation rates in kindergarten catchment areas 
presented as participation rates in the corresponding categories. To compare changes in areas in 
intense treatment categories with changes in control areas with zero treatment, we use 
difference-in-differences estimates. The results show that the kindergarten attendance rate only 
exhibits a significant increase in the high participation rate group compared to both the 
catchment areas that were not affected by the program (the control group) and the other, lower-
intensity treatment groups.14 Moreover, the jump in the enrollment rate in the high-intensity 
category is observable only after 2008; the change between 2006 and 2008 is on the order of 
                                                 
14 In evaluating the effects, it is also helpful to recall the data from Table 8, which show that only 5% of 3- 
to 4-year-olds (somewhat over 9,000 children) live in high-participation-rate catchment areas. 
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one to two percentage points in all categories.15 This result provides further evidence of a causal 
effect of the program on attendance rates. 
Table 8 
Change in kindergarten attendance rates in 2008-2010 by treatment intensity 
(catchment area-level program participation rates) 
 
Program participation 
rate* 
3-year-olds  4-year-olds 
2008 2010 Δ  2008 2010 Δ 
0 % 77.2 79.4 2.2  93.1 94.7 1.6 
0.1 – 5 % 72.6 73.2 0.6  93.1 92.3 -0.8 
5.1 – 20 % 73.7 73.6 -0.1  90.5 93.2 2.7 
Over 20 % 68.6 78.0 9.5   89.9 96.9 7.0 
*The number of children newly enrolled in kindergarten in 2010 whose families received the 
20,000 HUF payment / number of 3- to 4-year-olds living in the catchment area. 
A PANEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM'S IMPACT 
To obtain more credible estimates of the program's impact, we estimated fixed-effects panel 
regressions, using catchment area level data spanning ten years. As a reminder: the kindergarten 
catchment areas were defined as geographical units that can be considered relatively closed 
systems with respect to kindergartener commuting. The dependent variables are standardized 
measures of 3- and 4-year-olds' kindergarten enrollment rates. We use standardized measures 
because the catchment areas are measured with error, and the population data are also 
imperfect. As a result, the enrollment rate variables themselves are not always straightforward to 
interpret (there are measured enrollment rates above one, for example). In subsequent 
regressions, we examine the effects of interactions between the program and the supply of 
kindergarten locations. To maintain comparability of the estimates, we dropped 48 of the 
original 1,420 catchment areas, due to missing data on the supply of kindergarten locations. 
Thus, all regressions are based on a panel of 1,372 catchment areas. 
The main right hand-side variables are the three dummy variables of treatment intensity (0.1 
to 5 percent, 5.1 to 20 percent and above 20 percent) for the years 2009 and 2010. The formulae 
for the main right-hand-side variables are: 
                                                 
15 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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The baseline regression equation is the following: 
 1 2 31 2 3     kt kt kt kt k t kty T T T a d u    . 
In the formula, k denotes the catchment area (k = 1, 2, ..., 1,372); t denotes the year (t = 2001, 
..., 2010); ykt  denotes the dependent variable, the standardized kindergarten attendance rate of 
3- and 4-year-olds; ak  denotes catchment area fixed effects; dt  denotes year fixed effects; and ukt  
denotes unobserved heterogeneity across catchment areas and time. The variables T1, T2 and T3 
are binary variables that measure the intensity of the program. The parameters β1, β2 and β3 
measure the program's impact. The latter are difference-in-differences parameters; they measure 
average change in kindergarten attendance rates in the respective catchment area type between 
the reference period and the base period compared to the average change in the kindergarten 
attendance rate of the control group between the reference period and the base period. Formally: 
if  iy  denotes the conditional expected values of kindergarten attendance rates in the i
th 
kindergarten catchment area type (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) in period τ  (τ: t0= 2001–2008, t1= 2009–2010), 
controlling for all other factors, and △i denotes the differences between the reference and base 
periods' conditional expected values (
1 0
  i i it ty y ), then the i  parameters measure the 
differences between these differences: 0   ii . All three parameters express these effects in 
units of the standardized dependent variable. 
Table 9 presents the results of the regression estimates. The cases are weighted by the 10-
year average number of 3- to 4-year-olds in the regressions, and clustered standard errors, 
consistent under heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, are estimated. 
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                                                                                                                                     Table 9 
Effect of kindergarten attendance allowance in panel regressions 
 
 Dependent variable: standardized 
kindergarten attendance rate 
3-year-olds 4-year-olds 
T1 -0.221 -0.401 
 [0.081]** [0.068]** 
T2 0.156 0.005 
 [0.069]* [0.070] 
T3 0.549 0.303 
 [0.098]** [0.096]** 
Catchment area fixed 
effects yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes 
Number of 
observations 13,451 13,449 
Number of catchment 
areas 1,372 1,372 
Within R-square 0.01 0.01 
Clustered standard errors in square brackets 
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
 
The results are similar with respect to the kindergarten enrollment of 3- and 4-year-olds. 
Similarly to the aggregate results in Table 8, the estimated effects are large in the high treatment 
intensity areas. We observe a decrease in kindergarten attendance rates in the low program 
participation rate areas relative to the changes in the control (0% program participation rate) 
areas and a slight increase in the medium participation rate category. There is a significant 
increase in kindergarten enrollment rates in the high program participation (over 20 percent) 
category, with a difference of 0.30–0.55 standard deviation units relative to the control areas. 
This result indicates that the program did have a causal effect on the attendance rate. 
Finally, we address the problem of supply constraints. The kindergarten attendance 
allowance program was intended to stimulate kindergarten enrollment in a context where there 
is shortage of kindergarten slots in some areas. We can hardly expect a significant impact if there 
are major supply constraints. Conversely, we can expect a stronger impact if there is an ample 
supply of kindergarten slots. Because the kindergarten catchment areas are quite heterogeneous 
with respect to the supply of kindergarten slots, the available data enable us to test these 
hypotheses. 
The indicator variable used to measure kindergarten capacity is described above in the data 
section. Low values for this indicator indicate a shortage of kindergarten slots, while higher 
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values indicate excess supply. This indicator is also characterized by some measurement error in 
both the capacity data and the delineation of catchment areas. Thus, we did not rely on the raw 
kindergarten supply indicator but used five categories of supply (quintiles) to obtain a less noisy 
indicator.  
To avoid small sample size, we combined the low and medium participation rate categories 
and interacted the three program participation categories with the five supply-based categories. 
The variable T12 denotes the combined low and medium categories after 2008: T12kt = T1kt+ 
T2kt. The regression equation is as follows: 
    5 5
1 1
12 3kt j kt jk j kt jk k t ktj jy T S T S a d u           
In the formula, k denotes the catchment area (k = 1, 2, ..., 1,372), and t denotes the year (t = 
2001, ..., 2010). As before, ykt  denotes the standardized kindergarten attendance rate of 3- and 4-
year-olds; ak denotes catchment area fixed effects; dt  denotes year fixed effects; and ukt  denotes 
unobserved heterogeneity across catchment areas and time. The variables T12 and T3 are binary 
variables measuring the intensity of the program. In contrast to the baseline regression, the 
present regression equation includes interactions: the Sjk binary variables takes a value of 1 if the 
kth catchment area falls into the jth supply category (j = 1, 2, ..., 5) and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Note that we do not enter the Sjk dummies in addition to their interactions, as they are absorbed 
by catchment area fixed-effects. 
The βj parameters measure the impact of the program in low/medium participation rate 
catchment areas that fall into the jth supply category. For instance, β1 measures the difference 
between the kindergarten attendance rate in 2009-2010 and the average attendance rate of 
previous years, in the catchment areas with the lowest supply of kindergarten slots and 
low/medium program participation rates, compared to the difference between attendance rates 
in the two periods in the control group (0 participation rate). Similarly, β5 measures the 
difference between attendance rates in two periods, in the catchment areas with the greatest 
supply of kindergarten places and low/medium program participation rates, compared to the 
difference between the attendance rates in the two periods in the control group. Analogously, the 
γj parameters measure the impact of the program in high participation rate catchment areas that 
fall into the jth supply category. All parameters express differences in units of the standardized 
dependent variable. 
Table 10 reports the results. As with the baseline regressions, cases are weighted by the 10-
year average number of 3- to 4-year-olds, and standard error estimates are clustered at the 
catchment area level to allow for arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
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Again, the results are similar with respect to the 3- and 4-year-olds. The estimated impact is 
generally zero (not statistically significant) or negative in the low/medium program participation 
rate areas. The kindergarten enrollment rate in high program participation rate areas exhibited a 
significant increase in nearly all supply categories. In the areas with excess supply, this increase 
was generally above the average of the other catchment areas; in the 5th quintile, the estimated 
impact was 0.75–1.56 standard deviation units.  
While the results are consistent with our expectations, they also reveal important insights. It 
is not very surprising that a program that stimulates demand has its largest impact when there 
are no supply constraints. However, it is surprising that kindergarten attendance rates increased 
in areas with high program participation rates, despite supply constraints. This result suggests 
that the cash incentive has an effect on poor families' decisions to enroll their children in 
kindergarten, even under unfavorable conditions. Furthermore, it appears that kindergartens 
attempt to meet demand even when they are above capacity, leading to more overcrowding and, 
in all likelihood, a decrease in the quality of service. This should serve as a reminder that 
creating an adequate supply of kindergartens is necessary in these catchment areas. 
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Table 10 
Effect of kindergarten attendance allowance by the supply of kindergarten slots 
 (regression estimates with interactions) 
 
  
Dependent variable:   
standardized kindergarten attendance 
rate 
  3-year-olds 4-year-olds 
T12 × kindergarten supply,  
1st quintile 
Shortage of 
kindergarten slots 0.285 0.090 
  [0.085]** [0.082] 
T12 × kindergarten supply,  
2nd quintile  0.020 -0.200 
  [0.068] [0.083]* 
T12 × kindergarten supply,  
3rd quintile  -0.244 -0.382 
  [0.083]** [0.075]** 
T12 × kindergarten supply,  
4th quintile  -0.193 -0.511 
  [0.154] [0.234]* 
T12 × kindergarten supply,  
5thquintile 
Excess supply of 
kindergarten slots 0.047 -0.102 
  [0.265] [0.221] 
T3 × kindergarten supply, 
1st quintile 
Shortage of 
kindergarten slots 0.428 0.279 
  [0.119]** [0.144] 
T3 × kindergarten supply,  
2nd quintile  0.585 0.361 
  [0.173]** [0.128]** 
T3 × kindergarten supply,  
3rd quintile  0.484 0.205 
  [0.186]** [0.259] 
T3 × kindergarten supply,  
4th quintile  0.228 0.078 
  [0.189] [0.186] 
T3 × kindergarten supply, 
5thquintile 
Excess supply of 
kindergarten slots 1.556 0.746 
  [0.440]** [0.287]** 
Catchment area fixed effects yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes 
Number of observations 13,451 13,449 
Number of catchment areas 1,372 1,372 
Within R-square 0.02 0.01 
Clustered standard errors in square brackets. 
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we evaluated the impact of the kindergarten attendance allowance program two 
years after its nationwide introduction on January 1, 2009. We have shown that the Hungarian 
data are in line with international studies demonstrating that children from poor families amass 
large cognitive deficits before they reach school age. However, the data also suggest that longer 
kindergarten attendance can effectively reduce these cognitive gaps and the resulting school 
achievement gaps. We have shown that 3- to 4-year-olds from uneducated families attend 
kindergarten for shorter periods of time than the national average. This result indicates that 
increasing the kindergarten enrollment rates of 3- to 4-year-olds from poor and uneducated 
families could effectively mitigate their subsequent school failures. 
Low kindergarten enrollment rates of poor children are attributable to both supply-side 
factors (inadequate kindergarten capacity at some locations) and demand-side factors. 
Enrollment rates could be increased by kindergarten expansion and construction and by creating 
incentives for families in the target group to enroll their children at the age of 3. The 
kindergarten attendance allowance program we evaluated was a conditional cash transfer 
program that created such incentives but failed to address supply issues. Its implementation also 
suffered from additional weaknesses (delayed installments and in-kind benefits instead of cash 
transfers in many municipalities).  
Our program evaluation was based on a non-experimental difference-in-differences 
approach that used rather noisy enrollment data defined for kindergarten catchment areas. Our 
estimates using national aggregates suggest that the enrollment in kindergarten of 1,500 3- to 4-
year-olds in 2010, out of the approximately 8,400 allowance recipients also enrolled in 
kindergarten that year, can be attributed to the effect of the program. This result suggests that 
approximately one-sixth of all kindergarteners participating in the program were enrolled at age 
3 as a result of the program. 
Panel regressions of approximately 1,400 kindergarten catchment areas spanning ten years 
show that the increase in the enrollment rate was large in areas with over 20 percent program 
participation but not elsewhere. We have also shown that in areas characterized by high program 
participation rates, enrollment rates increased mostly in areas characterized by an excess supply 
of kindergarten slots. However, increases were also observable in areas in short supply of 
kindergarten slots, potentially leading to a decrease in the quality of service. This result should 
serve as a reminder that ensuring an adequate supply of kindergarten slots should be an 
important policy goal. 
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The 2011 modification of the public education act changed the situation. The new regulations 
reduced the age of mandatory kindergarten enrollment to 3 for the school term beginning in 
September 2012, which made the kindergarten attendance allowance's goal of increasing 
enrollment obsolete. However, the unsolved problems related to kindergarten enrollment 
remain. The cost of kindergarten attendance may represent a major financial burden for the 
poorest families, making it impossible to guarantee that all children will enroll, even if 
enrollment is compulsory. New investments will still be necessary to counter overcrowding and 
inadequate capacity of kindergartens.  
Incentives for regular kindergarten attendance should be combined both with activities that 
decrease the social distance between kindergartens and the affected families and with 
complementary program elements that provide a variety of parenting tools. It is important for 
parents to actively participate in this process to ensure that they recognize the relevance of 
playful learning, literacy, books and frequent storytelling to the development of their children. If 
necessary, kindergartens should take a role in helping to develop the requisite parenting skills. 
Although young children from poor families may suffer from skill gaps, such gaps are not 
unremediable. Expert and caring support can significantly reduce these disadvantages, a fact 
that should be more widely recognized in kindergartens across the country. There is so much to 
do in this field. 
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